Zelenskyy's Attempt to End the Donbas War
Volodymyr Zelenskyy entered the presidency in 2019 with no record in government and a strong mandate to try something different. Ending the shooting in Donbas and bringing prisoners home were central tests of that promise.
He was willing to reopen direct contact with Vladimir Putin and accept steps his predecessor had approached more cautiously. That flexibility produced tangible humanitarian gains, but it also triggered fear that Moscow would turn compromise into permanent leverage over Ukraine.
Zelenskyy's scale of victory gave him room to experiment: he won the runoff with more than 73 percent of the vote, and his party soon gained a parliamentary majority. Voters backed him for many reasons, but his promise to pursue peace was unmistakable.
Exchanges and Disengagement
Telephone conversations between Zelenskyy and Putin helped arrange a September 2019 exchange in which the 24 sailors captured near Kerch, filmmaker Oleh Sentsov, and other Ukrainians returned home. Ukraine transferred 35 detainees to Russia in return.
The sides also pulled troops and equipment back at selected places along the contact line. Disengagement at Stanytsia Luhanska allowed repairs to a damaged pedestrian bridge, while withdrawals at Zolote and Petrivske aimed to create additional areas with fewer armed positions.
These moves were limited rather than front-wide. Each required verification, demining, and confidence that the other side wouldn't occupy the space left behind.
Disengagement also created local anxiety. Residents and volunteers asked who would protect communities after Ukrainian troops withdrew, leading the government to emphasize that police and other state services would remain.
The Steinmeier Formula
The most politically difficult step was Ukraine's acceptance of the “Steinmeier Formula,” named after former German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier. It proposed a mechanism for activating special status in separatist-held districts around local elections.
Under the formula, the special-status law would apply provisionally on election day and become permanent if the OSCE's final assessment found that voting met democratic standards. Zelenskyy stressed that elections had to follow Ukrainian law and couldn't occur under armed coercion.
He also said Russian troops would need to leave, illegal formations would have to disarm, and Ukrainian parties, media, election officials, and observers would need safe access. His October 2019 explanation rejected elections “at the barrel of machine guns”.
Critics still saw danger because the formula didn't itself settle when Ukraine would regain the border. Thousands joined “No Capitulation” demonstrations, warning that special status before security could legitimize Russian-controlled administrations.
The protests weren't simply a rejection of negotiation. Their central argument was that elections held before demilitarization could convert the results of force into a protected political structure inside Ukraine.
The Paris Summit
On December 9, Zelenskyy met Putin for the first time at a Normandy Format summit hosted by Emmanuel Macron with Angela Merkel. The agreed conclusions reaffirmed Minsk and called for a comprehensive ceasefire, more disengagement areas, mine clearance, new crossings, and another detainee exchange.
Dozens of people returned in a December exchange, and additional releases followed in 2020. The parties also opened or prepared new crossing facilities and kept talking through the Trilateral Contact Group.
These outcomes mattered to families and communities even when they didn't transform the conflict. Peace diplomacy was producing individual returns and local improvements while the largest military and constitutional questions stayed frozen.
Yet the leaders didn't agree on the decisive sequence. Zelenskyy pressed to restore Ukrainian control of the border before elections, while Putin held to the order written into Minsk II, where elections and political changes came first.
The summit promised another meeting within four months, but it never happened. Fighting continued, access remained restricted, and no acceptable election or permanent-status arrangement emerged.
Progress Without a Settlement
Zelenskyy's approach proved that direct contact could free detainees, repair infrastructure, and reduce danger in specific places. It did not persuade Russia to relinquish control of the separatist entities or accept Ukraine's security-first reading of Minsk.
The next opening was narrower and more practical: stopping fire without resolving politics. In July 2020, negotiators adopted the strongest Donbas ceasefire measures since the war began.
The 2018 Kerch Strait Attack and Capture of Ukrainian Sailors
The 2020 Donbas Ceasefire